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BAR BRIEFS

all times in order to control and superintend the conduct of counsel,
jurors and spectators. New trial granted.
Tandsetter vs. Oscarson. Plaintiff, while working for the City
of Fargo as a motorcycle policeman, was run into by the defendant
and quite seriously injured. Application was made to the Workmen's Compensation Bureau by the plaintiff, the claim was approved,
and an award made by the Bureau, covering medical and hospital care
and compensation for both temporary and permanent disability. As
between the City and the plaintiff, the Compensation Act and the
award disposed of all questions of liability. The liability of the defendant, however, was one in tort, and plaintiff claimed the right to
bring suit for damages. Under Section 20 of the Compensation Act,
the Bureau is subrogated to the rights of the injured employee, but
should the Bureau sue and recover more than the amount paid out,
including costs of suit, the injured person is entitled to the overage.
The Bureau investigated, and, being of the opinion that it might not
be able to prove the defendant's negligence, or, if successful in that,
might not be able to collect upon a judgment recovered, decided not
to bring suit. Plaintiff then started his action, and subsequently obtained an assignment from the Bureau, in turn indemnifying the Bureau
against costs and stipulating that any judgment recovered should be
applied: first, to the costs of suit, secondly, to the amount paid the
plaintiff out of the Workmen's Compensation Fund, any balance then
left to go to the plaintiff. The defendant entered a demurrer to the
complaint. HELD: Application for and acceptance of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act operates as an election,
and the injured workman can not, thereafter, sue a negligent third
party; that right was transferred to the Bureau by the election to take
under the Act. (Note: The question of whether or not an injured
person could compel the Bureau to bring action against a negligent
third party was not involved, and was, therefore, not passed upon. It
is clear, of course, that the theoretical liability of a negligent third
party is greater than that of the Compensation Fund, as, for example,
under the tort action, recovery could be had for pain and suffering.)

JUDICIAL COUNCIL IN OPERATION
Pursuant to the Act of the 1927 Legislature, providing for its
establishment, the Judicial Council held its first meeting on the 15 th
day of December, 1927, at the Chambers of the Supreme Court in
Bismarck. The following'members of the Council were in attendance:
Supreme Court Judges L. E. Birdzell, John Burke, A. G. Burr, A. M.
Christianson and W. L. Nuessle; District Judges H. L. Berry, C. W.
Buttz, J. A. Coffey, G. Grimson, W. J. Kneeshaw, F. T. Lembke, J. C.
Lowe, Geo. M. McKenna, Geo. H. Moellring and Thos. H. Pugh;
County Judge J. L. Johnston; Attorneys B. H. Bradford, W. D. Lynch,
W. A. McIntyre, Win. G. Owens and C. L. Young; Attorney General
Geo. F. Shafer; visitors, E. R. Sinkler and L. R. Baird. Chief Justice
Birdzell presided.
Judge Christianson was first called upon to outline the activities
of the Council prior to the formal establishment by legislative act. He

BAR BRIEFS

pointed out the difficulties that had confronted the Supreme Court in
its efforts to carry out items of legislation dealing with procedure,
particularly those statutes that dealt with disqualification of trial
judges and the bank receiverships, which resulted in the calling of a
meeting of judges in May, 1926. Following that meeting the State
Bar Association took formal action favoring the enactment of a Judicial
Council Law, and appointed a committee to confer with the judges.
This conference was held in December, 1926, and, although there was
considerable discussion concerning various matters, the main work of
the conference is represented by the Judicial Council Act and the
appointment of a committee to report on Juvenile Court matters, particularly as to procedure.
Attorney General Shafer then outlined the work of the State's
Attorneys' Association, organized under his leadership and direction,
pointing out the problems that beset the better administration of criminal justice by reason of the fact that the three classes of men (the
judges, the prosecuting officers, and the private practitioners) are
forced, from the very nature of their respective lines of activity to
approach the problems from a different angle. Moreover, even after
a solution for a particular problem had been formulated to the satisfaction of these groups, it was found to be difficult always to sustain
the burden of proving to members of a legislature that proposed legislation was in the interests of the general public. The latter handicap,
he believed, was now overcome through the establishment of the Council, and stated, "We now have a body that is adequately organized for
the specific purpose of improving legislation with the right to incur
expenses and have them paid out of some appropriation. We now
have a body that is charged with the responsibility and has the power
to deal with the problems of the administration of justice. It is the
best agency that has come into existence for the purpose of meeting
the tasks and the opportunities that are before us."
Judge Nuessle, as Chairman of the Committee on Juvenile Court
matters, next presented the report of that committee, indicating, however, that Judge Pugh should be convicted of the charge of doing most
of the work, and citing several specific instances to impress the fact
that the committee was not so much concerned about the adoption of
a formal, fixed set of rules as it was about the propriety and necessity
of provoking further discussion to the end that something might be
evolved that would aid administrative officers in meeting the practical
problems created or aggravated by seemingly unusual facts and circumstances. The following is a summarization of the rules and explanatory statement adopted:
Juvenile Court
i. The petition or complaint should be set forth clearly, directly
and in detail, by the use of simple language.
2.
No such petition or complaint shall be filed with the clerk of
the district court until the same has been submitted to the district
judge having jurisdiction, nor until he shall have indorsed direction for
issuance of summons.
3. When summons is to be served personally it shall contain a
statement of each charge or shall have attached thereto a copy of the
petition or complaint.
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4. The clerk of court shall keep a "Juvenile Court Record" for
such cases, which shall not be subject to examination by others than
the clerk, the district judge and the juvenile commissioner except upon
written order of the district judge. Information in the files or the
record shall not be made public.
5. Upon making arrest of a person known to the peace officer
to be a minor under 18, such person shall be taken before a juvenile
commissioner or the district judge instead of before a justice of the
peace.
6. If taken before a commissioner, that officer shall immediately investigate the facts and report his findings to the district judge, who
shall determine whether further proceedings shall be under the Juvenile Court Act or under the Code of Criminal Procedure, and if the
latter, the district judge shall sit as committing magistrate.
7. In sentencing a person under 21 to the penitentiary a statement setting forth the peculiar facts that induced the district judge
to so commit the offender shall be transmitted to the warden.
By way of explanation the Committee directed attention to the
various mandatory acts and court decisions that should be considered
in connection with Sections 11402 to 11428 C. L. 1913, Chapter 179
Laws of 1915, Chapter 83 Laws of 1921, and Section 11281 C. L.
1925, particularly stressing the fact that the Legislature did not establish a new court but merely clothed the district courts with enlarged
discretionary powers. State vs. Overby (N. D.) 209 N. W. 552, is
quoted thus.: "The district court has jurisdiction over all criminal
offenses and exclusive original jurisdiction over all felonies, and of
all persons brought therein, charged with the commission of crime.
The Juvenile Court Act does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction in criminal causes; it specifically states in the repealing clause that
it is cumulative and not exclusive as to all law, excepting only the
law as administered in justice and" police courts. . . . The intent to
divest justice courts and police courts of all jurisdiction is made unmistakably
clear. . . . Section 11416, which requires the officer
making
the arrest
to give into the care of a juvenile officer all children
arrested under the age of 18 years, is to prevent children of tender
years from being thrown into jail with hardened criminals and is in
harmony with the object and purpose of the juvenile act. . . . The
juvenile court is not a criminal court; and it is the purpose of the law
to treat juvenile offenders under 18 years of age not as criminals, but,
as far as practicable, to give them the paternal care of the home, to save
them from the stigma attaching to crime, to guard and protect them
against themselves and all evil-minded persons,"
Procedure
In explanation of the recommended procedure the following was
approved: That, upon complaint to the commissioner, he should make
summary examination of the facts having in view the delinquency complained of, the conditions of the home surroundings, rights of parents,
guardian or custodian, and the maintenance of control in the natural
guardians, if possible.
Should the commissioner find this inadvisable, a petition should
be procured, setting forth with clearness, directness and in detail the

B3AR B3RIIEFS
charges made. The making of the petition by the commissioner should
be the last resort. Omnibus charges should be avoided in the interest
of (i) certainty in the disposition of the child; (2) justice; and (3)
that the charges may be met and that disposition will be upon the
charges made.
The title of the case should be "The State of North Dakota vs.
the child, parents, guardian or next friend and all whom it may concern," although the law seems to indicate that the child alone is to be
named as defendant.
Upon filing of the petition or complaint with the commissioner
entry should be made in his docket and a more formal examination
conducted, notice being given all persons concerned, witnesses subpoenaed and examined, and such temporary order made as the evidence warrants.
Should it be necessary to enter a final order, it is the duty of the
commissioner to make report and recommendations to the district
judge, who shall fix a day of hearing. The petition, findings, recommendations and order should then be filed in the office of the clerk
of court, and summons issued by the clerk. Service of summons should
be made on all persons interested. In the Solberg case, 203 N. W. 898,
the Court said: "The statute clearly contemplates notice of the proceedings before the commissioner, and, we think, by necessary implication, of the hearing before the district judge."
At the hearing the defendants may appear personally and by
counsel. The complete record should disclose the following: i. The
petition; 2. The report and recommendation of the commissioner;
3. The order for hearing; 4. The summons; 5. The return of service;
6. The answer of the defendants or any of them; 7. The appointment
of a guardian ad litem if the parents are not interested (The commissioner may be such); 8. The taking of evidence, record of which is
made; 9. The findings and conclusions of the court; Io. The order
making disposition of the child.
The legal right to removal of custody from the parents is dependent upon the following findings by the court: i. That the child is
under 18; 2. That the facts show delinquency as charged; 3. That the
parents are unfit or improper guardians, or are unable or unwilling to
care for, protect, train, educate, correct and discipline the child; and
4. That it is to the best interests of the child and the State that it be
taken from the custody of the parents. In Ex Parte Blackey, 2o8 N.
W. 238, the Court said: "Under Section 11402 the juvenile court
has jurisdiction over the child only while it is a ward of the State, and
it is a ward of the State until it is 18 years of age. . . . The supervision and further orders cannot go beyond the term of the stewardship of the State which terminates when the child reaches the age of
18 years."
The district court is vested with comprehensive discretion and
may enter final orders as follows: i. Permitting the child to remain
in its home, subject to the" friendly visitation of the commissioner, and
to report from time to time to such officer or to the court; 2. Appointing some reputable citizen as guardian of the person of the child and
therein directing the guardian to place the child in a suitable family

B3AR BRIEFS
home and to provide the necessary maintenance and clothing and to
oversee the education, discipline and care of the child; 3. Committing
the child to some suitable institution for the care of dependent or neglected children; 4. Committing the child to the State Training School.
In committing to a guardian or an institution other than the State
Training School the religious beliefs of the parents of the child shall
be considered by the Court.
Following the consideration of the foregoing report, Mr. C. L.
Young, Past President of the State Bar Association, presented rather
clearly and in detail the opportunities before the Judicial Council,
stressing the thought that the Council was not to be considered as a
conference of judges, but an official body, including practicing lawyers, rather independent of the courts, and charged with the responsibility of working out remedies that would cure defects of administration that are not entirely legislative in character.
Having read the record of the proceedings of this organization
meeting of the Judicial Council, we are impressed by the constructive
character of all of the discussions, under the leadership and direction
of Chief Justice Birdzell. Practically every member present had a
share in those discussions, which were pertinent to the matters under
consideration, and disclosed application and diligence deserving of the
highest commendation. We extend our share of it.
Judicial Council Rules
i. The Judicial Council shall hold two regular meetings in each
year on the third Tuesday of the months of April and October, such
meetings to convene at ten o'clock A. M., at the rooms of the Supreme
Court at Bismarck, North Dakota. Special meetings of the Council
may be called by the Chairman whenever he deems such meetings
necessary. The Chairman shall call a special meeting of the Council
whenever a request therefor, in writing, shall be made by ten members
of the Council.
2.
The Executive Secretary of the .Council shall give notice, in
writing, of the time and place of all meetings to the members of the
Council, by sending such notice at least ten days prior to the holding
of any meeting.

3. There shall be an Executive Committee consisting of the
Chief Justice and four members to be elected from the membership
of the Judicial Council. The elective members of the committee shall
be elected for a term of two years, two to be selected at the October
meeting of the Council, provided that at the meeting in October, 1928,
four members shall be elected, two of whom shall serve for one year
and two for two years, the terms to be assigned by lot. Any vacancy
arising in the membership of the Executive Committee shall be filled
by selection made by the remaining members of the Executive Committee and the person so selected shall serve during the remainder of
the term of office vacated.
4. The Executive Committee shall have power to and shall appoint special committees from time to time, as may be required, to
investigate all matters and questions submitted to it by the State Legislature or the Governor of the State, each Committee so appointed shall
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report its findings and recommendations as to matters and questions
submitted to it to' the next regular or special meeting of the Council.
The Executive Committee shall select the Executive Secretary of the
Council. The Executive Committee shall receive and act upon the
recommendations made by the Council at any meeting. The Executive
Committee shall, at least thirty days before any regular meeting of
the Council, file with the Executive Secretary a full report of the
findings and work entrusted to any Committee, together with recommendations as to the program and matters to be considered at such
meeting of the Council; copy of a report of the Committee and its
recommendations for consideration at meetings of the Council shall be
at once forwarded by the Secretary to each member of the Council.
5. A quorum of the Judicial Council shall consist of a majority
of the members. They shall have full power and authority to transact
all business which may regularly come before the Council, provided
that no recommendation shall be made to the Legislative Assembly, or
to the Governor of the State, except on the affirmative vote of threefourths of the members present.
6. The order of business shall be: i. Reading and approval of
the minutes of regular and special meetings; 2. Reports of standing
committees; 3. Reports of special committees; 4. Unfinished business;
5. New business.
7. These rules may be amended, altered or changed, or added to,
at any regular meeting of the Council.
8. In the absence or inability of the Chief Justice to act at any
meeting of the Judicial Council, the acting Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside over deliberations and sessions of the Council
and perform the duties of the Chief Justice.
Judicial Council Committees
The following commitee appointments were authorized at the
meeting, and subsequently announced:
Executive Committee-Judge W. L. Nuessle, Chairman exofficio; Mr. C. L. Young, Prof. Roger W. Cooley, Judge C. W. Buttz,
Judge A. M. Christianson.
Committee to investigate the operation of the conciliation statute
and to consider the advisability of substituting for the conciliation
method a small claims court-Judge J. L. Johnston, Chairman, Judge
George H. Moellring, Mr. B. H. Bradford.
Committee to investigate and report as to the advisability of limiting appeals from justice court to the district and county courts and
from such courts to the supreme court-Mr. W. A. McIntyre, Chairman, Judge M. J. Englert, Judge John Burke, Mr. Wm. G. Owens.
Committee on reducing the costs of the administration of justiceJudge John C. Lowe; Chairman, Judge C. W. Buttz, Judge F. T.
Lembke, Judge G. Grimson, Mr. W. D. Lynch.
Committee on statistical bureau-Judge A. G. Burr, Chairman,
Prof. Roger W. Cooley, Judge J. A. Coffey.
Committee on changing the terms of court-Judge Fred Jansonius,
Chairman, Judge Geo. M. McKenna, Judge H. L. Berry.
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Committee on amendment of iuvenile court act-Judge Thos. H.
Pugh, Chairman, Judge W. L. Nuessle, Judge W. J. Kneeshaw, Hon.
Geo. F. Shafer.
Conference of Judges
The Conference of Judges, provided for under Section 9 of the
Judicial Council Act, was held upon adjournment of the Council. At
this conference the discussion centered upon the advisability and necessity of making changes in existing court rules.
COMMENT ON FACTS
The Judicial Council of the State of Massachusetts, acting favorably upon the proposal to repeal the law of that State which prevents
a Judge from commenting upon the facts in jury trials, had this to
say:
"A majority of the Council believes that as time goes on it is more
and more important to honest, poor litigants who can not, or do not,
have as shrewd, able and skillful lawyers as their opponents, that
there should be a competent unmuzzled judge on the Bench, whose
sole duty is to do his best to see that justice is done impartially. This
is our understanding of the common law function of a Judge in accordance with the best traditions of the profession and of the public
service.
"Jurymen are drafted from their private affairs, often at serious
loss to themselves. If called upon to decide any important and difficult question outside of a court room, we believe that practical men
would expect to hear what a trained man, specially employed to sit
with them and listen to a case fairly, thought about it in order that
they might consider his views before making up their own minds. We
do not see why men should not have the same assistance inside of a
court room. The question seems to us one upon which the judgment
of the laymen of the community, who serve on juries, is likely to be
as good, if not better, than that of lawyers.
"The right to jury trial, guaranteed by our constitution, contemplates a trial before citizens of the same vigorous intelligence as of
old, who can be trusted to listen to the Judge's views if he feels that
the case calls for a statement of them, and at the same time to follow
his direction that they must make up their own minds and that it is
their own judgment which is to govern. . . . We believe that the
statute of 186o (preventing comment) is a reflection upon the brains,
courage and good sense of those of our people who are subject to jury
duty, and that it should be repealed. It should not be left to partisan
lawyers alone to deal with the facts, especially as the skill of one
may greatly outweigh that of his opponent. The jury should have
all the assistance in arriving at a just verdict which may be given
them by the only trained and impartial mind participating in the trial."
The approval was not unanimous, however, Mr. Frederick W.
Mansfield being quoted as follows :
"I am not impressed by the argument that under our present law
the Judge is 'muzzled.' He has a right to comment on the testimony
even now and as a practical matter it is usually a very dull Judge who
can not, and does not, intimate to the jury what his opinion is of the
evidence. But whether the Judge is muzzled or not under the present
law, I very much fear if it is changed that the result will be to take
the muzzle off the Judge and put it on the jury."

